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ABSTRACT:  
The purpose of this thesis is to study the effect of European banks’ operational risk on 
their capital adequacy. Thesis distinguishes between observed data published by the 
European Banking Authority and adverse economic conditions compiled in their Stress 
tests.  
Thesis utilizes a panel dataset of 666 operational losses reported from 21 European 
countries between years 2013 and 2018 with a series of explanatory variables to control 
for events in the economy and financial indicators. Countries are grouped into regions of 
the European Union to control for different characteristics in the European banking 
system. Additional tests use econometric techniques and tests for changes in the 
qualitative insights during the time period chosen. 
Results conclude that there is not a significant relationship between the level of 
operational losses and the capital adequacy reported by European banks; heterogeneity of 
results is also evident among different regions within European banking system. Rather 
than external risks to bank’s operations, financial indicators such as solvency and 
liquidity play an important role in the final capital adequacy ratio reported by European 
banks. Similarly, operational risk is not found to be driving lower capital adequacy ratio 
under financial distress or worst-case economic conditions. By employing robustness 
tests and alternative models, these findings are reinforced. Additionally, other risks such 
as market and credit have more potential to determine capital adequacy systemic shock. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Banking sector has evaluated different types of risk since its existence for the purpose of 
assuring financial stability. As financial institutions, banks have a determinant 
implication on the whole economic sustainability and welfare, thus their due diligence 
regarding risk management becomes essential. Referring to drivers of financial 
institutions sustainability, capital adequacy requirements settled by Public Central 
Financial Bodies represent the most valuable tool for assessing financial sustainability.  
With this aim, regulatory institutions both locally and internationally have set the path 
towards the control of risks in the financial sector, and applicable to this research, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the European Banking Authority are the 
main ones, and more specifically, the focus is based on the operational risk component 
that financial institutions face towards the accomplishment of capital adequacy. 
Barakat & Hussainey (2013) concisely explain the most important points of the Basel II 
accord that was introduced in 2004, differentiating three pillars in terms of operational 
risk which correspond to the bank’s capital adequacy and internal regulation, minimum 
capital requirements in order to face arising financial distress and the proper disclosure 
of the financial ratios and expenditure regarding risk. Consecutively, in 2006 the stated 
points were implemented by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and most 
European banks followed the recommendations but, as a drawback pointed out by the 
authors, Pillar 3 measures according to Basel Committee were quite general and there 
were no strict paths to follow, leading to a misrepresentation of what the purpose of the 
Pillar 3 was.  
Following these points already put into practice by the Basel II accord, financial crisis 
had an impact on the way regulation had to be settled. This was motivated by a set of 
failures and problems within the banking sector and the economy. Financial measures had 
to be taken into account and, according to Liikanen et al. (2011), banking sector had to 
be restructured to meet the needs of de-risking and deleveraging; the obligations met by 
state aids to support sector failures and ongoing regulatory reforms regarding capital and 
liquidity requirements. At this point these authors proposed five main reforms that had to 
be implemented in order to improve the quality of the previous regulations. They 
concerned the way banks need to report and transparently show their measures in terms 
of risk, trading activity and recovery solutions in the event of financial distress.  
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After previous Basel II regulatory framework and the financial crisis effects, Basel 
Committee (2018) had also to perform and develop a new framework meeting all the 
requirements of the economy and the banking sector. In 2010 Basel III was finally 
proposed to be applied for the correction of the abovementioned financial needs both for 
banks and society. It has been an ongoing process that has been revised all along the 
period comprising 2012-2019, but monitoring was already implemented in 2012 for the 
member countries. Among their main points to be supervised, minimum leverage and 
liquidity ratios, stricter requirements in common equity measures or a countercyclical 
capital buffer avoiding the anomalies of credit busts or booms. This new framework tried 
to test the ability of banks to overcome the past financial crisis and how resilient they 
could be if applying those measures to their operations. In order to measure this, EBA 
(European Banking Authority) launched the stress-testing practices to account for the 
possible adverse scenario in the event of financial crisis, as a means of avoiding potential 
losses and shocks on the banking sector.  
This paper provides meaningful conclusions about the impact of this kind of risk on the 
capital adequacy of the European Union banks, analysis that is extended with respect to 
adverse economic scenarios tests of the European Union. In other words, this thesis tests 
if the European banking system is influenced by the degree of operational exposure; 
moreover, it is also examined its ability to impact the Eurozone banking system in a 
systemic way. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by testing purely European 
sample, as a whole and among regions, including the analysis of operational risk influence 
into EBA stress tests results. At the time of writing this thesis, there were very few 
previous empirical researches investigating the impact of operational risk on capital 
adequacy, and no previous literature was implemented in the case of capital adequacy 
forecasted by stress tests. Thus, this paper is an initial path to assess the influence of such 
a non-observed risk factor as operational risk is both at stable and critical economic 
conditions.  
1.1. Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the possible impact of operational risk on the 
capital adequacy requirements of European Union banks. Operational risk is the expected 
operational loss of a bank within the period from 2013 to 2018; it is regressed with respect 
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to the Common Equity Tier 1 published by main economic repository databases and the 
EBA, representing the main capital adequacy indicator. According to operational risk 
disclosure, there is a set of categories within operational risk itself such as human 
behavior, information and technology equipment use or the presence of financial crime 
activities within the bank. On the one hand, it would be more accurate to include these 
measures separately in order to get more in depth results and comparing the weight of 
each category in the results; on the other hand, due to lack of resources and for the purpose 
of simplification,  it is more practical to include all these categories into a single variable, 
then making more global assumptions of what operational risk encompasses. Once this 
step has been fully completed, the second test of this paper is the assessment of the 
operational risk loss implication on the event of adverse economic scenarios. The point 
of this experiment is to argue if operational risk has real effects on the Common Equity 
Tier of the European Banking sector in the adverse scenario implemented by the EBA 
stress tests.  
In the case of the first test, I explain if the operational risk is an important component of 
the European Financial Institutions’ capital adequacy. With the aim of having a 
meaningful and comparable pattern in the dataset, I classify the results of this study for 
the whole sample of banks available and the defined geographic European regions since 
the beginning of the sample period; that is, since their inclusion in the transparency 
documents from where I am collecting the data. By means of this distinction, followed 
by robustness checks, I discuss if operational risk loss is homogeneously affecting the 
European banks’ capital adequacy among regions or, on the contrary, it depends on 
different countries and not representative of the Eurozone as a whole. Before writing this 
thesis, there was previous research focusing on more specific regions or countries, but 
with this new research I am seeking to provide a more global and consistent approach of 
the Eurozone, so as to influence financial institutions awareness of the importance of this 
issue. 
1.2. Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis has been planned to explain fluently the intended hypothesis or research 
question. First, I explain in depth all the theoretical concepts applied in this research’s 
methods: how operational risk is divided and the characteristics and peculiarities of each 
group. They represent the main independent variable of the regression model, and the 
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main point from where the rest of independent variables give an answer to the capital 
adequacy of European banks. Secondly, main ratios and types of risk to be studied are 
explained as well so that concepts are well defined and accordingly related to my research 
goal. In a second part, previous empirical evidence is considered for the purpose of having 
a real background from which subtracting meaningful conclusions. Then, results of the 
regression analysis are represented: first, regression results of banks’ capital adequacy, 
for the whole set and grouped into European regions; secondly, stress tests’ regression 
model for the whole sample divided into two periods. Finally, robustness checks are 
implemented for the consistency of the models. Last part summarizes the main findings 
and conclusions to be discussed implying suggestions for future research.    
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2. OPERATIONAL RISK AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
As I previously mentioned, this thesis is based firstly on the measure of operational risk 
component within a bank core financial data. Because of further simplified analysis and 
limitations in data gathering, the operational risk measure is defined as a whole variable 
which is regressed with the rest of financial ratios to address in this paper. However, it is 
essential to explain and divide in a more theoretical and readable way what operational 
risk is depending on their subsequent components.  
Operational risk encompasses a set of factors that are present in every business activity 
and organization. According to Coleman and previously settled by the Basel II Committee 
in 2001, “Operational risk is the business risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people, systems, or from external events” (2010). It refers to the degree 
at which a company can control and prevent a loss in their most basic and bottom-level 
activity which remains in the utilization and performance of the main services a company 
offers. Another important point to mention is that the author effectively assigns this type 
of risk to any organization or industry, but even in any other activity apart from the 
business spot (distinguishing that losses could be also made of intangible assets and 
value).  
Nevertheless, in the specific case of banking, other authors like Abdullah, Shahimi and 
Ghafar Ismail defined Operational risk as “a residual risk given the fact that any risk faced 
by a bank that is not market risk or credit risk falls under this category” (2011: 131-151). 
Banking is composed of three different types of risk and it has the obligation of mitigating 
the total amount of loss arising from these misbehaviors or failures within the core 
business activity. That is why all the operations carried out for the purpose of absorbing 
this loss will have a wealth protection component rather than a profit generation aspect. 
With these previous operational risk definitions, I study in depth which are the type of 
events encompassing operational risk. I ensure that the different components of 
operational risk would add up to a single measure that is, at the same time, comparable to 
the other types of risk faced by financial institutions that, at the end of the day, play an 
important role in the whole risk valuation of a bank’s activities. 
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2.1. Operational risk and its components 
2.1.1. Human factor  
Starting the distinction between the existing components within operational risk, the 
human factor could be thought to be the most evident and simple to understand. In any 
industry, the human component represents both first-line service employees to top 
management activities and decisions concerning the enterprise. What does it happen when 
employees do not perform with due diligence in their job position? It goes beyond the 
transaction itself as, mentioning Coleman’s paper (2010); it has a repercussion on the 
brand image and reputation of the bank. This represents a potential loss as well for the 
bank, measured within the operational risk as previously pointed out.  
Little due diligence as it has been pointed out is the main reason why human factor occurs, 
and Coleman stated a classification of mistakes according to “fatigue, incompetence, lack 
of management supervision, and inadequate staffing levels”. This is one of the main 
points of the research paper of Harris (2006) and its application of operational efficiency 
within the airline sector. According to this author, efficiency is meant to be the general 
purpose of the whole business activity; on the contrary efficiency is not made by a solely 
established component as human factor could be. The paper finds key to improve the 
whole organization as a sole body where human factor is in a close relationship with the 
rest of components of the business activity. When performing a specific task, the proper 
functioning of both human and machines and processes becomes the only purpose from 
the organization perspective.  Consequently, the quality of the operating system has to be 
appreciated by the final consumer and this economic agent is indeed the true evaluator of 
the efficiency in the service line. 
2.1.2. System equipment  
Secondly, I classify operational risk based on the level of technology systems failure or 
diseases. A good implementation of data processing elements in a business line plays an 
important role on the final service quality. Citing again previous research paper of Harris 
(2006), it was pointed out that technology rather than human factors were the main drivers 
of operational efficiency. Considering this statement and its application on the banking 
industry, an effective electronical payment method to allow transfers among customers 
could be a potential risk of loss for the bank if this service is not well designed and 
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implemented. In addition to this main issue, “programming errors, errors in data 
management, insufficient processing capacity” comprise other failures included in this 
category, where not only it is mentioned technological implementation but information 
processing or storage. It should be highlighted that the banking industry must strictly 
accomplish regulation for contracts signatures and compliance matters, so paperwork or, 
in a more developed technological age, virtual agreements, represent the principal issue 
to respect. Therefore, the truthful and proper treatment of documents becomes again a 
potential threat for the loss of a bank direct revenue generation but also prestige or 
reputation among its customers. 
2.1.3. Fraudulent activity: Financial crime 
Once it has been analyzed both system and human failures within the operational risk of 
a firm, the following component may be the most relevant one or maybe the one with 
higher attributed relationship within the total amount of this variable. As a primary step, 
Gottschalk (2010) defined financial crime as “crime against property, involving the 
unlawful conversion of property belonging to another to one’s own personal use and 
benefit”. At the same time, he stated that financial crime has linked the concept of fraud, 
misbehavior in the way to treat property and trying to find legal holes to perform without 
being detected or sanctioned.  It can be represented in many ways, according to this same 
author like corporate fraud, bank account fraud, payment (point of sale) fraud, currency 
fraud, and implying more common practices like tax violations, money laundering or in 
more recent technological banking system, cyber-attacks.  
In a deeper meaning of what financial crime is, it has been already thought to be structured 
and organized in more complex and systematic procedure. In this case the term evolves 
to the concept of Corruption, which would be defined by this same researcher as “the 
giving, requesting, receiving, or accepting of an improper advantage related to a position, 
office, or assignment”. It may involve politic parties or companies when accomplishing 
their obligations towards the public entities. A good example on this matter would be the 
research carried out by Purcell (2006) where Australian local government was studied 
from a behavioral finance perspective. At some point governments and individuals were 
found to have several reasons why they act in such a way, and potential interests like 
decision making, power and self-interest or even risk-taking desire. 
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 For a better understanding of the corruption issue, Sampford et al. (2006, p. 1) stated that 
within a society, corruption represents the most inherent component for not assuring a 
solid and stable society and the wealth derived from this. This idea is a general and 
common approach when talking about profitability and reputation correlation, which is 
applied to every kind of business activity and organization. Actually, Purcell points out 
that the misbehavior of an individual could anyways influence the misconduct of more 
complex structures and groups, finally involving political parties or, in some very famous 
cases, top index companies (Enron’s case). Unfortunately, this same author was not able 
to give a clear explanation of why these practices are motivated for, so corruption motives 
are still on the spot of further research. Following reputational effects, Micocci (2009) 
discovered that there exists obvious reputational effect regarding internal fraud practices. 
This author analyzed cumulative abnormal returns in a window event which showed sharp 
negative impact on its values.  
As an opposite phenomenon of this current and existing problem, it is well known that 
private corporations are implementing new policies to ensure the proper functioning of 
its economic structure and, at the same time, preventing the existence of shady activities 
within it. Gilsinan et al. (2008) argued that policies carried out to control financial crime 
or abuse can be made in many different ways, but in any case the implementation would 
be based on the correlation between the degree of privatization of the company and the 
incentives for the private corporation. As a result, they showed that, in most cases, it was 
quite difficult to find real incentives when complying with governmental framework, that 
is, the high cost of the policies demanded were one of the most important constraints to 
the establishment of an effective and efficient strategy from the point of view of the 
private corporation.  
Another issue derived from this paper was the real application of sanctioning policies 
regarding a legal approach. Papers like the one carried out by De Koker (2007) pointed 
out that countries can be well structured in terms of Legal Frameworks (the example of 
South Africa was shown), but the point is to enforce the financial investment on this 
structures to ensure their real application. Related to this investment it is included working 
conditions like salaries and, in general, an improvement of the availability of resources to 
allow these practices. Unfortunately, referring to Ponsaers (2002), this task is becoming 
even more complex as legislation worsens rather than clarifies distinctions among types 
of crimes in the business field.  
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Following the idea introduced by Gilsinan et al., Harvey (2018) also addressed the issue 
of the behavior of Legal institutions towards the abolishment of financial crime. The main 
point this author focuses on is that, based on previous research and findings, regulatory 
frameworks may have been settled but there was a clear evidence of inconsistency in the 
application of those. The result of such a non-valid application would be the rise of 
vulnerabilities in the whole financial system, flows of money and shady activities that 
could be out of the regulators’ eyes or control. The author ends up recognizing that the 
existence of financial crime is unavoidable, and its control resides on the fact that “it is 
perfectly acceptable for some fish to swim through the net”.  
In relation to this last idea, I should also remark that financial crime potential has 
increased exponentially in the last decades through the increase and development of 
virtual and technological networks which allow transactions and virtual money to be 
hidden. A notably recent paper addressing this topic was the one of Didimo et al. (2014), 
where authors have developed an operative system with the aim of detecting the with the 
highest possible accuracy the path followed by, mainly, money launderers and fraud 
seekers. They highlighted the importance for finding patterns and identifying the 
economic agents behind encrypted data. The massive volume of data composing these 
financial networks is the biggest challenge to face when creating a more reliable and 
effective detection system.  
In line with financial networks, banks have promoted the presence of electronical 
payments through their online systems. Armey et al. (2014) developed a meaningful paper 
to explain the key insights about this kind of transactions and channels. They studied the 
possible correlation between the access to electronic financial payments and the 
propensity to observe economic crime, and their results suggested the negative and 
significant correlation of the statement “higher access ends up in lower incidence”. 
Moreover, they also experienced this relationship as a good reason for development in 
poorer countries, by means of strengthened supervision for further economic activities. 
Hence, they indicate there is a promoting attitude from the point of view of financial 
institutions to implement in the present and near future the consolidation of this type of 
payments. It would not only mean an easier business activity for customers but also a 
growing wealth for defined economies. 
14 
 
2.2. Main Capital Adequacy indicators   
The second phase of this thesis’ theoretical part is dedicated to the definition and 
understanding of the main Capital Adequacy indicators to be used in the research, which 
correspond, in the case of the Common Equity Tier 1, to the dependent variable of the 
regression model, and to the control variables in the case of both liquidity and solvency 
ratios. The ratios are analyzed and defined according to previous research and official 
Financial Institutions guidelines as the BIS (Bank of International Settlements – Basel III 
Committee) to give consistency and transparency. 
2.2.1. Common Equity Tier I 
This value is assessed in order to know if it is affected by the operational loss of European 
Banks. According to Basel Committee (2019), the Common Equity Tier 1 (abbreviated 
as CET1) is defined as the “highest quality of regulatory capital, as it absorbs losses 
immediately when they occur.” This final report in 2019 summarizes the target that 
European Banks should accomplish by this year, being 4.5% the final target. Among its 
components, it is included the sum of common shares together with stock surplus value, 
retained earnings, minority interests and other comprehensive income, in addition to 
regulatory adjustments. It is chosen for this research as the core of the regulatory capital 
banks in the Eurozone (and worldwide) should respect, without taking into consideration 
less strict components as AT1 & AT2 would be (additional Tier 1 and 2). 
2.2.2. Solvency Ratios and Liquidity Ratios 
The first variable is considered as a control one for the purpose of the research hypothesis. 
It is important to notice the typology of the Solvency ratio, the most accepted definition 
and the one introduced by the Basel Committee (2014) in the Basel III accords, as it 
should not be equally treated. In the case of the former, solvency ratio is meant to assess 
the ability of a company or bank to pay its long-term liabilities (Ucal & Oksay, 2011). It 
can be based on the computation of short and long-term debt by the amount of total assets. 
This is the ratio to be used in our regression model as accurate and more data has been 
found with respect to the latter in the case of the first regression; Basel III Leverage will 
be included in the second regression model to account for robustness in the EBA stress’ 
tests. 
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From a regulatory perspective, the Basel III leverage ratio settlement is motivated by the 
creation of excessive leverage on the banking system that was accounted and not 
accounted on balance sheets of European banks. As a rule, it is designed as a “simple, 
transparent, non-risk-based leverage ratio” constituted as a complement to the already 
existing risk-based capital requirements. By means of a credible leverage ratio, the Basel 
Committee tries to account for the effects of both on and off- balance sheet declaration of 
leverage. Then, Basel III leverage ratio is composed by the capital measure (the 
numerator) divided by the exposure measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed 
as a percentage:  
(a) Basel III Leverage ratio = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒  
The Institution objective at the settlement date was to test a minimum requirement of 3% 
for the leverage ratio within the period from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2017. 
In addition, Liquidity is employed simultaneously to the abovementioned control 
variable. At the same time as Leverage ratio was settled, Basel Committee (2014) also 
created the Basel III Liquidity coverage ratio as a reaction to problems in the easiness of 
converting assets (so-called HQLA or High Quality Liquid Asset )  into liquid instruments 
(cash) on a 30-days calendar period (so-called Total Net Cash Outflows). This time frame 
was thought to be appropriate for institutions to take corrective actions. The fraction 
would be as follows: 
(b) Basel III LCR= (Stock of HQLA )/(Total Net Cash Outflows in a 30-days 
calendar period) ≥ 100% 
This ratio is therefore a more specific measure of short-term resilience of European banks 
under stress-tests with adverse economic scenarios. In the case of this thesis, a more 
broadly accepted liquidity ratio, measuring as well the ability of commercial banks to 
meet  liabilities when they are due and its incurred cash (Alshatti, 2014), is employed 
based on the Net Loans divided by Total assets of the bank. It represents the amount of 
loans outstanding with respect to total assets. If it is high, the liquidity of a bank tends to 
be lower. As mentioned in the previous subsection, higher availability of data with respect 
to the regulatory Basel III ratio is preferred for the purpose of this thesis’ model.  
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2.3 Systemic Risk 
To finish the theoretical framework of the thesis, it is essential to explain the implications 
of the interest in predicting Systemic Risk for the whole of the European Union banks. 
As a result of the linkage between the previous control variables explained and the 
systemic risk component, its understanding represents a main objective of this research. 
Recent authors have addressed the importance of determining systemic risk and its 
definition. 
Acharya et al. (2010) initially reflected that systemic risk analysis seems to be able to 
forecast the financial firms that contributed in a more harmful way previous systemic 
crisis. Regarding this assumption, systemic risk is a reliable tool to control financial firms 
that are potentially dangerous to the economic environment. The latent need for definition 
and purpose of stress-tests was officially set by the European Banking Authority (2011) 
as a tool “to assess the resilience of the EU banking system, and the specific solvency of 
individual institutions assessed, to hypothetical stress events under certain restrictive 
conditions.” Deeper specifications were made by Acharya, Engle & Richardson (2012) 
by defining stress tests as a “standard device used to determine the capital that an 
institution will need to raise if there is a financial crisis”. According to them, systemic 
risk is based on the capital shortfall under the economic crisis scenario for a specific firm 
i. This can be represented by the expression:  
(c) SRISK i,t = E t-1 (Capital Shortfall i  │Crisis) 
A more accurate definition of stress tests tools was set by Oura (2012) as “Stress tests are 
forward-looking tools to assess financial institutions’ solvency and liquidity and the 
resilience of the entire financial system under possible adverse scenarios”. However, they 
also specified that this assumption is made taking into consideration as well that stress 
tests do not measure the probability of those economic scenarios occurring. That is the 
reason why further research should be implemented. Supporting the need of systemic risk 
definition and awareness, later Derbali & Hallara (2016) found that systemic events occur 
principally after the outbreak of financial crisis which resulted after the 2007 great 
financial crisis and 2010 sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Furthermore, they also agree 
that the European Banks are the most important source of contribution to the systemic 
risk of their economies, what is in line with the purpose of this thesis.  
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However, previous literature does not agree on which is the most effective measure on 
the Systemic risk estimation. At a first attempt of determining reliable measures of 
systemic risk, Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) found CDS and bonds much more 
determinant to predict financial stress than measures based on stock market, arguing that 
the main reason would be a more direct relationship to the concepts of default risk and 
financial stress-tests.  Pederzoli and Torricelli (2017), using the current thesis EBA stress-
tests exercise results, show that it is not possible to relate MES (Marginal Expected 
Shortfall) to them; either CoVar is reliable to predict the specific institution’s systemic 
risk potential – this last finding goes on the opposite direction as the paper of Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) which establishes wider risk management measurements that can 
be applicable to systemic risk estimation - . This thesis as well contributes to expand the 
range of possible measures of systemic risk with the adverse scenario results of CET1 in 
the Eurozone.   
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3. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
As an initial point, it is relevant to know if Operational Risk disclosure is important to the 
Banking system relying on previous literature. According to previous research, 
operational risk disclosure and its correlation with banking performance has been met by 
other authors such as Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton (2006) where they did not find a 
positive association between these two measures. Others like Bischoff (2009) supported 
the idea that implementation of regulation frameworks implied a higher level of risk 
disclosure in banks that would be in line with the Basel Committee premises and goals. 
Barakat and Hussaney (2013) as well proposed that operational risk disclosure quality has 
a positive outcome on stakeholders when outside monitors or supervisors are implicated 
– by means of independence and power supply -.  
On the contrary, other authors like Ford et al. (2009) argued that practically half of a 
sample of 65 international active financial institutions were effectively accomplishing 
minimum requirements of the regulatory frameworks. Following this last premise of 
effective implementation in the real world, Brown et al.(2008) found that, even though 
operational risk disclosure has been promoted in a business extent and may avoid losses 
with respect to it, this kind of information is not valuable in case investors do not react 
and employ it in their analysis. This last idea is held by Acharya, Engle and Pierret (2014): 
if we were interested in controlling for operational losses, it is not found regulatory risk 
to have a significant weight on the realized risk of a bank in the event of a financial crisis. 
Up to this point the need of reporting operational risk may seem unclear to have a positive 
impact.  
Next phase focuses on how the measure of operational risk has been made previously. In 
line with the measure of potential risk, authors like Dutta and Babel (2014) tried to 
evaluate how big would be the loss from the existence of operational risk in business 
activity. They pointed out that previously this kind of risk was measured as a residual 
component for banks apart from market and credit risk. Hence from this statement they 
concluded that operational risk was not being addressed as it should, what would be in 
detrimental of banks and financial institutions interests. Parallel to this study Chernobai, 
Jorion and Yu (2011) discover a set of determinants in an internal level that they thought 
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to be understated, considered as independent events which could be improved by internal 
controls and management. 
Other source of debate is the distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
Jobst (2007) guesses that consistent risk estimates are dependent on the reporting of 
operational risk losses and the model sensitivity of quantitative methods – and maybe a 
qualitative model complements and improves data robustness -. In the case of Bardoscia 
(2012) he proposed an abstract dynamic model from the LDA comprising both accidental 
generation of losses and losses events caused by interactions between different processes 
– with remarkable explanatory power – in a bank internal level.   
Extensive literature has made efforts on assessing Operational Risk using a Loss 
Distribution Approach. Introduction to it was made by Frachot, Georges and Roncalli 
(2001), by computing the capital charge of operational risk as a means of strong risk 
quantitative methods in the banking sector. Followers of LDA as Jimenez-Rodríguez 
(2009) argued LDA model presents much more innovative conclusions than non-
advanced approaches proposed by the Committee like the Basic Indicator Approach or 
the Standardized Method. One year later Shevchenko (2010) replied that Bayesian 
Methods were more suitable as, by nature, assessing the dependencies of operational risks 
is much more complex than previously thought.  
Furthermore, there is a common point on the assessment of operational loss and bank’s 
performance regarding event studies. One of the main concerns has been the market value 
of banks and its potential stock value loss from operational losses. Cummins, Lewis and 
Wei (2006) addressed this problem by evaluating stock value response to operational 
losses events. Both in the banking and insurance industry in the U.S., it was found that 
generally stock value responded negatively to operational loss events (higher than $10 
million), within a (-5,-1) trading days event window period: operational loss has an 
immediate negative impact on stock value even prior to the operational loss 
announcement.  Consequently, Cummins, Wei and Xie (2007) extended this discussion 
by distinguishing the effect of operational losses on announcing and non-announcing 
firms, within and across the financial industry (commercial, investment banks and 
insurance companies). They also found significant the negative abnormal return on stock 
value, specifically to non-announcing firms both at intra-inter industry level.  
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Additional papers such as Gillet, Hübner and Plunus (2010) agree on the capability of 
operational losses to explain stock market value decrease, introducing the concept of 
reputation damage. This research goes beyond stock value loss and relates it to firm 
reputation; cumulative abnormal return is found to be negative when operational losses 
are recognized, and returns are worsened when they are found to be caused by fraud, 
which indeed turn into reputational damage. Reputation in this case is linked to firm’s 
value, potentially threatened by the type of operational loss incurred. Same argument is 
also followed by Sturm (2013) to support this association, where operational loss events 
determine the loss of stock market value of financial firms (measured with respect to 
cumulative abnormal stock returns around the date operational loss was firstly noticed in 
the press); further conclusions are derived from this study as reputation damage is 
independent from the event type, size or growth indicators of financial firms. 
From these articles, the bank performance is understood and measured according to stock 
market value and revenue from a shareholder’s point of view. Opposite to this approach, 
the interest of this thesis relies on the measurement of banks’ performance according to 
regulatory requirements under a regression model; in this sense, the capital adequacy ratio 
has not been broadly evaluated across literature. Limited papers considered capital 
adequacy as a representative performance indicator, in very different economic and 
banking systems with respect to the European Union. Recent papers such as Aspal and 
Nazneen (2014) examined capital adequacy ratios with respect to other bank’s 
performance characteristics including credit, liquidity, sensitivity and operational 
efficiency indicators. According to the last one, named as “Management Efficiency” 
variable, they found a positive significant relationship with capital adequacy; the increase 
in the net income generated with respect to expenditures from bank operations influences 
the better capital adequacy ratio. This is the opposite concept as this thesis means by 
“operational risk”, as according to them less loss resulting from banks operations 
represent better capital adequacy ratio (it is presumed but not confirmed the opposite 
effect).  
The definition of “Operational Efficiency” instead of operational risk or loss has been 
repeated across previous literature; an example of this is the paper of Abusharba et al. 
(2013), where the criteria is to measure the operating expenses to the operating income. 
These authors also represent this ratio as a management quality property of banks, and 
they found it to be insignificant to impact the final capital adequacy ratio of Islamic banks. 
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This opposite conclusion from the one given by Aspal and Nazneen provides non-
homogeneity of results across banking systems; moreover, they introduce that the 
objective of the research was to find significance without interpreting if positive or 
negative. After this statement, it is still a question to be explored among countries, the 
kind of impact of operational efficiency in capital adequacy ratios, even more when this 
thesis provides a different approach of operational performance assessment, in a negative 
instead of positive way.  
Moving to the systemic risk evaluation, it has also predominated the use of event study 
models. Another type of event study considered along operational risk measures has been 
the tail event. It is the case of Curti and Migueis (2016) who evaluated the risk tailed 
distributions on operational risk losses; it was proven that, despite measuring future 
operational losses based on past losses was reliable, all those large operational risk losses 
based on more rudimentary LDA approaches were not predicting future expected 
operational losses as simpler average frequency metrics did. Further research has been 
implemented, and a very relevant paper in which I recall along this thesis is the one from 
Berger et al. (2018) as it also applies the application of tail events into the measurement 
of operational risk as a source of systemic risk (arguing indeed it has a more systemic 
nature, in addition to the fact that systemic risk is influenced by high-severity risk tail 
events, also relevant for our research hypothesis).  
Following risk tail event approaches and, specifically to this thesis, to systemic risk 
events, a more accurate and detailed analysis of bank’s operational losses and its impact 
on systemic risk was implemented by Abdymomunov, Curti and Milhov (2015). The 
operational risk loss was divided into potential loss categories events: mainly “Clients, 
products and Business practices” and “Execution, delivery and Product Management”, 
accounting for a 90% of the total banking industry loss, were found to be negatively 
correlated with the variable of interest, “Macroeconomic Growth”. It indicates that the 
operational risk affects notoriously the global economic performance, measured by the 
increase in productivity among industries; it tends to explain periods of economic 
downturn, motivated principally by operations and transactions with direct clients. Later 
in 2017, Abdymomunov and Ergen added to previous literature that as a result of tail 
losses dependence across large banks, it is possible to confirm a potential systemic risk 
that is common to a large sample of banks, occurring in a simultaneous way.   
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A subsequent debate is the fact that systemic risk and operational risk are correlated as a 
cyclical phenomenon. Related papers like Allen and Saunders (2004), (previously 
mentioning that, at that point, no extensive literature was available for the measurement 
of macroeconomic and risk factors cyclicality) found market and credit risk to be much 
more pro-cyclical whereas operational risk was uncovered to be counter-cyclical. The 
meaning of this statement is that market and credit risk would move according to the 
conditions of the economy while operational risk would be thus moving in the opposite 
direction. By contrast, this same last author together with other (Allen and Bali (2007)) 
showed that operational risk represents 18% of total equity returns for financial 
institutions when financial catastrophe is experienced. Hence, they give an opposite 
statement which assumes procyclicality in operational risk measures. Besides, Eckert and 
Gatzert (2019) duly argue that significant losses are experienced in a set of financial firms 
because of spillover effects from large operational losses. Jiřina (2012) as well supports 
the fact that both high operational losses and its exponential trend are significant for the 
stability of the economy (while this paper assures there is no visible trend on operational 
losses).  
Systemic risk can be motivated by several economic factors. Silva, Kimura and Sobreiro 
(2017) argued that the financial sector is negatively impacted by the rise in 
macroeconomic and financial stress. This fact, according to them, was due to regulatory 
aspects. This last issue was also addressed by Köster and Pelster (2018), who associated 
financial penalties and systemic risk to be correlated (while banks were not the main 
contributor). Simultaneously, financial penalties would also make banks more vulnerable 
when systemic risk events were observed. Under the premise of financial distress, 
Kaspereit (2017) found that operational losses are experienced in periods of abnormal 
negatives stock returns while they explain contagion around the European financial 
industry.  
Others like Acharya et al. (2010) found that the most harmful component of financial 
crisis in determining the likelihood of systemic risk was the short-term debt. Another 
focus was business size. Already Amran, Manaf Rosli Bin and Che Haat Mohd Hassan 
(2008) explained that business size is relevant for the risk management disclosures. 
Therefore, more research was implemented to see a pattern in size and loss associations. 
Moosa and Li (2013) already mentioned the ability of bank size to be driving market 
value loss derived from operational losses, instead of leverage or others; abovementioned 
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paper from Abdymomunov, Curti and Milhov (2015) also agreed that size was driving 
potential operational loss. Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong (2016) as they proved bank size 
to be strongly affecting the rise of systemic events – large banks have such an influence 
that it was not clear how to control their impact, so they proposed capital tightening 
requirements that could be parallel to this thesis proposal - .  
Nevertheless, previous literature addressing systemic risk has also discussed the non-
contagion ability of operational losses. Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006) refused this 
idea and did not provide great importance of contagion probability of default in a banking 
system regarding interbank connections. Generally, risk of contagion among banks has 
been modeled by analyzing the probability of default of a bank considering other banks 
balance sheets fixed; this criticism is said not to be correctly assessing the ability of 
contagion of a whole banking system, otherwise it is suitable for conditions where a 
banking system is proved to be idiosyncratic. This discussion is extended in Elsinger, 
Lehar and Summer (2013), as idiosyncratic bank failures are characterized by operational 
losses, generally affecting a small portion of banks within an integrated system. Hence, 
from an interconnected banking system, specific and idiosyncratic events are not the 
drivers of insolvency in a whole banking system, mainly since the quantification of 
adverse scenarios leading to contagion is indeed very difficult.   
The findings derived from this set of studies have a common feature, that is, there is no 
consensus in the ability of operational losses : firstly, to explain bank’s performance; 
secondly, to measure its probability of contagion within banking systems , featured by 
periods of financial crisis. It relates to the method and data gathered to establish the 
connection between both which makes the gap between results and conclusions.  
When it is referred to operational loss and bank’s performance, the definition of the last 
one has been commonly referred to market value while recent papers have moved to 
bank’s strength to meet capital requirements. This is the reason why, at the same time, it 
is complex to give a solid and homogeneous answer to problems coming from different 
concepts and approaches. It has been reflected that there is extensive literature assessing 
bank’s market value by means of operational loss events; meanwhile, regression models 
have recently linked capital adequacy with operational efficiency instead of operational 
loss. Conversely, the relationship has not been yet confirmed to be significant, either 
positive or negative. It is also argued that, in case of finding impact of economic factors, 
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others have more significance than operational losses do. This is also mainly due to the 
availability of data regarding operational risk by banks as appointed by Ford et al. (2009), 
what has been translated into different scopes and methods to quantify it.  
Systemic risk has also been debated to be explained by operational loss as a contagion 
phenomenon: conclusions are also dependent on the type of model used, as event or tail 
loss studies are inclined to prove the rise of operational losses simultaneously to economic 
downturn. Again, literature has not been found regarding regression predictive models, 
where capital adequacy was meant to represent bank performance, operational loss 
accounting for non-idiosyncratic banking systems either. The contagion effect of 
operational loss is now reviewed as a linear relationship instead of accidental loss events, 
in other words, the aim is to find common patterns along time rather than analyzing cause-
effect relationships.  
This thesis incorporates new perspectives to the measurement  of capital adequacy and 
financial crisis events motivated by operational risk: it  applies purely official information 
about bank’s risks disclosure, both for stable and under adverse economic conditions, by 
the European Banking Authority, from a wide range of banks and countries within the 
European Union. In contrast to other papers focusing on a single country as it has been 
found on previous empirical evidence, the heterogeneity of banks in our sample makes 
challenging the finding of answers to the research question. European Union has very 
specific features as a global banking system, and its heterogeneity is evaluated to know 
if previous results can be applied to it. Consequently, it is discussed if the operational risk 
variable significance depends on European regions or if it has a standardized pattern and 
its importance with respect to other economic indicators. Nevertheless, the difficulty itself 
of quantifying operational risk by individual banks also has implications on the data 
collected by the EBA, something to discuss within the robustness checks of our results.  
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4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS  
The hypothesis of this study involves the issue of how operational risk of European banks 
has an impact on the capital adequacy of the European Union. Given the data of 
operational risk values across banks in different countries of the European Union and its 
corresponding capital adequacy ratios, I create two hypotheses: firstly, regarding the 
operational risk effect on capital adequacy ratios of banks across Europe. The hypothesis 
formulation would be as follows:  
H0 : Operational Risk value of banks does not affect the EU capital adequacy  
H1 : Operational Risk value of banks affects the EU capital adequacy 
In this first regression model, it is tested if the capital adequacy is affected by the extent 
of operational losses incurred within the chosen period. The significance or not of this 
variable has been under discussion previously, and different results have been found. In 
the event of proving operational risk to be significant, it is expected to find inverse 
(negative) relationship as generally higher operational losses were found to reduce capital 
adequacy ratio (on the contrary, operational efficiency has contributed to better capital 
adequacy ratios).  
Another supplementary hypothesis is tested to gather more meaningful information about 
the relationship of the two measures, in this case regarding the systemic risk of European 
Union banks. Consequently, if operational risk is able or not to explain significant 
relationship with the capital adequacy of the EU banking system, I would be interested in 
knowing if operational risk is also implying that the banking sector systemic risk is 
influenced as well, represented by the results of the EBA stress tests. For this reason, the 
second main hypothesis of this research is: 
H0: Operational Risk does not explain systemic risk of the EU Banking sector  
H1: Operational risk explains systemic risk of the EU Banking sector 
As formulated in the previous hypothesis, it is reviewed the ability of operational loss to 
influence banking systemic risk. In case of finding significance, positive relationship is 
expected from previous evidence given that a higher systemic risk would be motivated 
by operational losses incurred by banks within the banking system. On the contrary to 
papers focusing on single countries, European Union systemic risk is under evaluation.  
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Once set these hypotheses out, it can be argued that there is more significant impact on 
the capital adequacy of the whole EU banking system of other variables that are included 
in the regression. They would be called control variables and they relate to different ratios 
influencing banking performance of the banks included in the sample: on the one hand, I  
include those related to features that are determinant for the bank’s performance of EU 
banks (size or business volume of the bank, book to market value and return on assets, or 
the net income of each bank); on the other hand, I  set control variables related to other 
risks apart from operational risk that are also determinant for banks’ capital adequacy and 
systemic risk ( financial, credit, liquidity, market and sovereign risk). 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
The purpose of this study is to assess the possible impact of operational risk exposure 
number of banks on the European Union bank’s capital adequacy, that is, the Common 
Equity Tier indicator observed within the period 2013-2018. Consecutively, it is assessed, 
in line with the results of the first step regression, if the adverse scenario Common Equity 
Tier published from subsamples 2013-2016 & 2015-2018 are affected as well by 
operational risk. 
5.1 Data 
Tables 1 and 2 correspond to the supervised financial institutions included in the 
transparency exercises of the European Banking Authority, which publishes yearly the 
financial institutions’ reports in terms of transparency and detailed bank-by-bank data 
regarding asset quality, capital positions and risk exposure amounts. These tables are 
shown with all the countries analyzed year by year (from 2013 to 2018). From the two 
tables, countries with less than two supervised banks during more than 4 periods were 
excluded from the final sample of this research with the aim of eliminating non-drivers 
of the results (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Other Banks).  
[Table 1 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
Mentioned figures are materialized into a total panel data sample accounting for 
regression analysis of 666 bank observations for each variable, together with the control 
variables that I explain later. After controlling for outliers with respect to Common Equity 
Tier 1 in our sample, a final version of 525 observations is analyzed, classified by bank 
cross-sectional data and year period data. At the same time, sample is divided into regions 
according to the geographical situation of countries in our sample, distinguishing between 
Southern, Western-Central and Northern Europe (Avdeev et al., 2011). For the purpose 
of ensuring homogeneous sample among regions, United Kingdom and Ireland are 
included in the Northern region. The countries are divided after accounting for outliers’ 
detection. The purpose is to compare results between the whole sample and regions to 
give consistency to the conclusions and, at the same time, to find new insights about 
European banking sector patterns. A detailed list of banks included in the sample is 
shown. 
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[Table 3 here] 
Conversely, scenario for 2013-2016 and 2015-2018 results of the EBA stress’ tests 
publications are included. They represent the 2013(2015) initial or actual result for each 
of the variables. Again, outliers’ detection process and homogeneity of both periods’ 
sample was considered, resulting in a total number of 189 and 177 observations, 
respectively. In this case the results are based on European Union banks supervised 
without grouping as, because of data size, we would not get reliable conclusions. A 
detailed list of banks assessed in our study is described in table 4.  
[Table 4 here] 
[Table 5 here] 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of European banks (differentiating 
among all banks, Northern banks, Western-Central banks and Southern banks) included 
in our first regression model. Referring to the main variables of interest, CET1 and 
Operational risk, we can obtain some preliminary conclusions: the Operational risk 
exposure on average is around 18.5 million euros for the global European Union; 
meanwhile, this figure varies among regions depending and, at the same time, in relation 
to the total size of the banking sector in each region. This is why if Southern banks are 
compared to Northern or West-Central ones, the operational risk is consequently much 
lower; on the other hand, it is possible to assume that the Western-Central region, is 
presumably a more concentrated banking system as Northern region in terms of total 
operational risk and size in million euros.  
Secondly, Common Equity Tier 1 along the sample period for European Banks was 
14.17% ; the minimum one that has been settled for the 2019 year is 10.6% according to 
the ECB (European Central Bank), this means that our sample of banks within the 
European Union, in a year frame of 5 years, would have widely accomplished current 
capital adequacy requirement. However, this is neither a real measure of each country 
solvency nor of each bank. This mean is empowered by top performer countries or banks, 
which have a higher weight on the statistics. Simultaneously, this is proved by looking at 
each region: Southern banks had lower capital adequacy than Northern or Western banks, 
a trend that has been typically associated to consequences from past financial crisis. 
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Northern countries, composed by the Nordics and British islands had the best adequacy, 
with a lower size and concentration as Western banks had.  
[Table 6 here] 
In addition, descriptive data corresponding to the adverse scenario from 2013 to 2018 is 
displayed in table 4. Note that, with the aim of having a reliable regression study of these 
indicators, I divided the sample into two subsamples corresponding to the stress-tests 
scenarios published by the European Banking Authority. Stress tests are performed based 
on prediction of a 4-year time frame: firstly 2013(to 2015) observed data; secondly, 
worst-case economic conditions determine the forecasted indicators in year 2016 (to 
2018). For this reason, data should not be combined or mixed as new factors have been 
considered for the second stress-test or even macroeconomic conditions have varied from 
one period to another.  
To proceed with the analysis of stress’ tests, we now focus more on the standard deviation 
and minimums of each period. It is possible to appreciate that the effect of adverse 
economic scenarios reduce drastically, compared to the first regression model, the figures 
of net income: means are negative in both periods, and if minimums are observed, net 
losses even reach the amount of 622 million euros in 2013-2016 stress tests. Compared 
to the 2015-2018 period, economic indicators can harm banks in a much higher extent. 
This is also reflected in the standard deviation of period 13-16 reaching 45.27. On the 
other hand, it is also interesting that average CET1 is reduced in 3-5 % with respect to the 
average CET1 of the first regression model; proof that stress tests estimate a significant 
decrease on general banking sector downturn.  
With the purpose of giving consistency to the results of the regression analysis, a group 
of variables referring to the characteristics of the banks of the sample have been included. 
Following Berger et al. (2018), these refer to the business volume of the bank, measured 
by total assets (called “size”); the market to book value so as to account for the real value 
of the firm at that time; the return on assets (RoA); and Net Income in the case of the 
second regression.  
Once I included the main bank’s features that are also significant for the systemic risk of 
the banking system, there are also other types of risk that I should add to the regression 
equation: financial, liquidity, credit, market and sovereign risk. With respect to the last 
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three, Duffie and Singleton (2012) explained that credit risk is the “risk of changes in 
value associated with unexpected changes in credit quality “. Then it is said to be any 
probability for a bank to see its credit rating to be reduced and, thus, affecting the final 
value of the credit activity. These authors also reflect that credit risk can be forecasted 
based on the probability of default of a third party and the amount of loss given default. 
Thus, this measure is also considered since it is such a determinant risk component on the 
bank’s activity and, applicable to this research purpose, to the systemic risk of the whole 
banking system.  
Remarkable components on the risk management of banks are also the sovereign and 
market risk. According to Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) sovereign risk is a result of the 
own country’s economic fundamentals especially during the rise of financial crises 
periods, a measure of financial contagion indeed. Enria, Farkas and Overby (2016) even 
insist on the need of including this risk assessment onto the balance sheets of financial 
institutions. Furthermore, they also found that “the decrease in market liquidity during 
the European debt crisis can be attributed mainly to those banks that did not maintain 
frequently updated disclosure on sovereign risk”. According to the second term, market 
risk is defined as “the risk to an institution’s financial condition resulting from adverse 
movements in the level or volatility of market prices” (Frain & Meegan, 1996). It has 
always been featured by its difficulty to be measured, as it incorporates different ways to 
be assessed, and at the same time the sum of assets and derivatives of varied nature. 
Generally measured by Value at Risk, the EBA tests compute it from the average net 
trading income volatility with respect to adverse market risk conditions (EBA, 2014).  
5.2 Methodology  
The analysis of the abovementioned variables is held as follows. An Ordinary Least 
Squares regression method is implemented in order to obtain meaningful conclusions 
about the impact of the operational risk exposure to the Capital Adequacy of the European 
Union banks, both in a global and regional scale, within the period 2013 to 2018. The 
structure of the hypothesis formulation follows a similar pattern to the ones proposed by 
Berger et al. (2018). The final sample of this study is structured into a panel data set from 
a bank-level perspective for European Union and subregions in this first regression 
model; the second one is based on the stress tests results.  
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The impact of European Banks’ operational risk exposure to their Common Equity Tier 
1 is assessed with the following panel setting: 
 
(1) CET1 i,t = c + β1 Op.Riski,t + β2 Sizei,t + β3 Market-to-Booki,t + β4 RoAi,t  
+ β5 Liquidityi,t + β6 Solvencyi,t + β7 Credit Riski,t + β8 Sovereign Riski,t 
 
The dependent variable CET1𝑖,𝑡  is the Common Equity Tier 1 for bank i in year t. The 
main explanatory variables are operational risk exposure (loss) at the end of year t, 
measured in million euros. Same way is computed the business volume (Size) of the bank 
i at year t ; Market-to-Book represents the Market to Book value or accounting 
profitability of bank i at time t ; RoA represents the return on assets of bank i at time t ; 
Solvency is the solvency  ratio of bank i at time t; Liquidity represents the liquidity ratio 
of bank i at time t ; Credit Risk is the ratio computed by Non-Performing Loans divided 
by Total Loans of bank i at time t ; finally, Sovereign Risk is the sum of all local country’s 
sovereign impact published by the EBA of bank i at time t. Note that raw data has been 
directly subtracted from the Data Repositories belonging to EBA (in the case of 
Operational Risk, CET1, Net Income and Market/ Sovereign Risk) and both FitchConnect 
and Orbis databases (in the case of Size, M-to-B, RoA, Solvency, Liquidity and Credit 
Risk for first regression model).  
In a second regression model, I used the Operational Risk losses and the rest of control 
variables in order to measure the impact of them to the CET1 in the case of adverse 
scenarios, published by the stress-tests of 2014 and 2016 by the EBA. The equation model 
would be as follows:  
 
(2) CET1 adverse i,t = c + β1 Ln(Op.loss)i,t + β2 Net Income i,t + β3 Market Risk i,t         
+ β4 Credit Risk i,t  (+ β5 Leverage  i,t ) 
 
Where CET1 adverse represents the Common Equity Tier 1 under adverse economic 
conditions of the Eurozone banks in this second regression sample, divided into 
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subsamples of 2013 to 2016 and from 2015 to 2018; Net income represents the net profit 
or loss of Bank i in year t; Market Risk represents the total amount of market risk 
exposure; Credit Risk is the amount published by EBA stress tests; ; for robustness tests, 
and due to the unavailability of this variable in the 2013-16 period, the variable Leverage 
is added in the second period to represent the Basel III Leverage Ratio used by the EBA. 
Accordingly, to the previous explanations of reliability of results, subsamples have been 
set to eliminate mixed CET1 ratios. Rest of control variables are used in the same manner 
than in the first regression model.  
As a preliminary check, it should be explained that results are provided according to the 
initial discussion of including or not fixed effects. This is explained in depth in the last 
section for robustness checks: the equation models are tested regarding a choice of Fixed 
or Random effects, implemented to see the fit of the sample to each of the effect-testing 
models. This choice is based on the Hausman Test that tries to set the rule for selecting 
the appropriate model. Furthermore, a comparison between the outcomes of the proper 
model and the alternative one is also provided to show possible insights. After the analysis 
of regression models, multicollinearity checks (Variance Inflation Factor is used to 
account for multicollinearity between variables) are also tested to ensure the validity of 
variables within the model and supporting the conclusions obtained.  
These robustness checks arise from the interest on the possibility of finding specific 
characteristics of the European Banking system among regions; moreover, the nature and 
periodicity of the data represents a concern for reliable analysis as, given the novelty of 
EBA and Basel Accord transparency reporting requirements, dataset only corresponds to 
this last 5-year period. Tables report the outcomes of the regression analysis and impact 
of each variable on the CET1 both for stable and under adverse economic conditions 
while assuming cross-section and time period fixed effects, or bank random effects in the 
case of the robustness check to give consistency to results. Outcomes are compared and 
the explanatory power of each circumstance is argued between regions and models.  
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results of the abovementioned methods and empirical research are now presented in 
this section. First, CET1 regression model results will be presented after Hausman Test 
checking. Same procedure is applied in the case of the Stress tests’ regression model. 
Finally, regression models are tested for alternative models and multicollinearity of 
variables and, in the case again of Stress tests, additional factors are added.  
6.1 Regression models: CET1 and Stress Tests’ results 
Before the analysis of the proposed regression models and results, a preliminary check 
for choosing between Fixed or Random effects is employed. This test is needed to provide 
more effective conclusions of the analysis of variables in the model to impact the 
dependent variable. The use of random effects should be made in case that omitted 
variables and their unobservable effect is not correlated with the set of independent 
variables. This argument (Wooldridge, 2009) implies that independent variables would 
be capable of explaining, at most, the possible variation in the dependent variable. The 
nature of the independent variables taken into account for this thesis’ regression models 
can have several reasons why random effects can or cannot be applied: for instance, 
different types of risk are not related or, in other words, pertain to different measures as 
capital adequacy do (ratios measuring leverage or liquidity may have stronger relation 
and, then, the fit of the model may indicate using fixed effects).  
This is also something to consider as the dataset, instead of having a larger time period, 
has a large amount of cross sections (that is, the number of banks used in this Thesis’ 
regression models). This is motivated by the fact that banks are clustered into regions, 
what Bell, Fairbrother & Jones (2018) argue that it would be reasonable to check if a 
variable of interest can vary among these groups or clusters. In line with this heterogeneity 
of data, random effects can be suitable when researchers focus on the role of the context 
of data, separating the within and between components in a model (Bell & Jones, 2015). 
The type of data gathered in this thesis could be a match to these assumptions, worth to 
test.  
Thus, testing for both the CET1 regression model and the stress tests are explored, 
consequently results are discussed following the model properly chosen from the 
Hausman test. The choice between random and fixed effects (Hausman, 1978) is based 
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on the comparison between the standard error of random and fixed effects estimation by 
evaluating the variance of the independent variables, again from random and fixed model 
results. Therefore, the objective of this test is to accept the Null hypothesis, which is the 
employment of random effects, otherwise rejecting the null hypothesis results in using 
fixed effects for the model. It is also tested for individual variables, which is also 
interesting for robustness tests conclusions and findings. Equation 3 shows the illustration 
of this test where βFE / βRE  is the output coefficients of fixed and random effects estimated 
whereas the difference in the variances of those coefficients is shown in the denominator:  
(3) 𝐻𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 = (𝛽𝐹𝐸 − 𝛽𝑅𝐸 )2 /  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽𝐹𝐸 − 𝛽𝑅𝐸 )  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
According to the first table, it is possible to appreciate differences among the regions of 
the sample. If the top section of the table is observed, which corresponds to the p-values 
of each model as a whole by region, EU, Northern and Western-Central countries are 
found to be assessed using fixed effects ( p-value < 0.05 or 5% significance level ); 
meanwhile, Southern countries have larger p-value of 0.44, indicating the random effects 
would be more appropriate. Therefore, these considerations are taken into account for the 
regression model shown in our empirical evidence section; however, the bottom section 
of table 7 shows p-values for individual variables of interest. Some variables show a 
different p-value from what the model is predicting, then additional arguments can be 
derived for the robustness checks, where some variables have a better fit with random 
effects implementation. That is the case of Operational Risk, which is observed for all 
categories to be a better fit of random effects; others such as liquidity are also observed 
to be broadly appropriate for random effects, so the comparison between both models is 
discussed in the robustness checks to see if the conclusions significantly vary or not.  
After this regression model, the focus is on the Stress tests’ Hausman results. Similar to 
the outcomes of the first regression model, Stress tests are also found to be appropriately 
measured by fixed effects rather than random effects. P-values for both subperiods do not 
reach the threshold of 5 % significance. As previously mentioned, the analysis is also 
compared to random effects in the robustness check section, in addition to other adjusted 
models.  
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Once Hausman-tests have been implemented, the results of our regression analysis are 
shown. This is the case of the CET1 regression model, corresponding to Table 9. The 
dependent variable in this model is CET1 or Capital adequacy ratio of each bank from 
year 2013 to 2018; this is available and recorded data after the closure of each accounting 
year, published by EBA and other data repositories the following year. Same type of data 
corresponds to the set of explanatory variables, from Operational Risk to Sovereign Risk. 
The analysis is divided into the regions of the sample, pertaining to European Union 
banks, Northern, West-Central and Southern countries, from column 1 to column 5, 
ordered from left to right. In the case of Southern Countries, both fixed and random effects 
are shown to provide an easier and uniform analysis. 
[Table 9 here] 
This research focuses the analysis on the European Union banks, what is shown in column 
1. Regarding the results of this first column, Operational Risk is not significant: the set of 
banks analyzed in this Thesis sample do not show an impact on the Capital Adequacy of 
European banks. This is the answer to the first hypothesis of this paper; in fact, further 
assumption is robust when other regions such as the Northern and Southern countries 
either show significance on operational risk. Conversely, it is found an interesting 
outcome in the case of the Western-Central countries: for them, a positive and significant 
relationship exists between operational risk and capital adequacy ratio.  
This implies that, for this group of banks, a higher amount of operational losses for banks 
is showing a better capital adequacy ratio for their banks. This figure, which is marginally 
significant (0.081, 10% level significance) is compared to alternative random effects 
where operational risk was found to be suitable. In any case, the model is shown to be 
sufficiently significant for the EU case (83% adjusted R-squared – low Standard Error of 
1.18), Northern as well, showing that little potential variance and high explanatory power 
is found.  
On the other hand, this is a path to further research, following previous insights about 
operational risk disclosure and potential impact on capital adequacy: it follows previous 
conclusions such as Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton (2006) where there was not 
relationship between banking performance (CET1) and operational risk disclosure; in the 
case of Western banks, it is in line with Bischoff (2009) where higher operational risk 
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disclosure led to better regulatory implementation, which indeed can improve bank’s 
regulatory capacity and performance; in addition, it also applies to the finding of Eckert 
and Gatzert (2019) who agreed that overall financial firms’ losses can be motivated by 
operational ones.  
Other insights can also be derived regarding the rest of variables included: model shows 
that the real drivers of the capital adequacy behavior are both liquidity and solvency 
indicators. This is the case of the latter for all samples analyzed, and all except from 
Northern countries in the case of the former. Therefore, a higher degree of solvency of 
banks is extremely associated to a better capital adequacy (for the European level, a single 
unit change in solvency ratio corresponds to a 39% change in capital adequacy ratio, and 
over 100% change in Northern and Western countries). In the case of liquidity, coefficient 
terms indicate a negative relationship with capital adequacy ratio (ranging from a 6 to 8% 
change), which implies that banks in a European level should incur in less short-term debt 
to improve the future capital adequacy requirement. It is a pattern in all subsamples 
analyzed, giving consistency to this practice in all levels of the banking sector: long-term 
prevails over short-term capability to repay a bank’s liabilities.  
Finally, other control variables have been significant at any point of the subsamples. Bank 
size, specifically, is a negative influence on the capital adequacy ratio: following Moosa 
and Li (2013) findings, the size of banks can drive market loss of banks and, in this thesis, 
the capital adequacy ratio. It implies then that the European Union suffers from a Too-
Big-to-Fail pattern, as bigger banks will have more impact on it that lower size banks. On 
Furthermore, together with operational risk, other types of risk included in our model 
were not significant in a general basis; neither credit nor sovereign risk are found to be 
impacting capital adequacy, only in the case of credit risk it represents a slightly important 
factor for Northern countries, where less credit risk would improve the capital adequacy 
ratio.  
A qualitative argument is derived at the same time for this set of results: it is obvious that 
the banking sector and its indicators are idiosyncratic. Significance that is found on 
different variables like RoA or Credit Risk depending on the subsample analyzed is 
obviously leading to this conclusion. Cerasi, Chizzolini and Ivaldi (2002) found this 
statement to be true due to deregulation:  idiosyncrasies are generally found for the 
purpose of competition among banks in different country levels, that is, obvious existence 
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of differences across banking industries. Therefore, along this paper analysis of results, 
differences can be found depending on the subsample analyzed, however that is the proper 
way to approach conclusions: comparing results among regions to better give conclusions 
on the European Union extent.  
After the analysis of the first regression model, stress test regression model is assessed 
with the aim of finding either supportive or opposite conclusions to the effect of 
operational risk on capital adequacy. In this case, the capital adequacy is measured in 
worst-case scenarios showing that (as previously done on the descriptive statistics 
analysis) the average capital adequacy ratio was significantly reduced. Because of this 
event, is the operational risk leading to this change? This is the hypothesis formulated in 
layman’s terms of this second regression model.  
Regression model for stress test and results are shown in table 10. Dependent variable 
CET1 corresponds to the variable recorded along the years from 2013 to 2016, in the first 
column, and from 2015 to 2018 in the second one. Distinction between the two subperiods 
is made following the publication of the stress tests’ forecasts: EBA studies the change in 
CET1 and rest of variables (mainly the other two types of risks are included such as credit 
and market risk, in addition to Net Income)  from an initial base year (2013 and 2015) to 
the following three years. It is important to analyze each period separately for the purpose 
of correct interpretation of data and non-duplicity. Each period considers economic 
indicators (these can range from volatility indexes, oil prices…) that affect differently the 
initial base year – thus, the outcome and prediction of the following years is also 
dependent on the scenario taken into account - . Before the start of this research, EBA 
2014 and 2016 publications were available, and with the aim of aligning findings with 
respect to the time period chosen for the first regression model, same period from 2013 
to 2018 is implemented. 
[Table 10 here] 
Referring to the results of the second regression under fixed effects, operational risk is 
not found to be significant in the event of adverse economic situation; capital adequacy 
is not impacted by a possible increase or change in the operational risk loss for the 
forecasted years, neither in the first nor the second period of the stress tests publications. 
Besides, the rest of variables are not significant either, even thought the explanatory 
power of the model is high (82 and 91%) and the standard error very low (0.96 and 0.92). 
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The null hypothesis is accepted and the operational risk does not relate to systemic risk 
in the European Union banking sector and, according to all the variables available in the 
EBA stress tests’ reports, other risks and performance indicators (similar to the first 
regression model findings) do not influence the capital adequacy under financial crisis.  
6.2 Robustness tests  
Previous regression models’ analysis is now tested for robustness by applying 
multicollinearity checks and comparison between the alternative random or fixed effects, 
depending on the choice made regarding Hausman test. First, the alternative models are 
shown in order to contrast and to support the conclusions derived from the chosen 
regression models. It can also be added that an alternative model of the regressions was 
considered for lagging values of the explanatory variables. Previous research showed 
event studies where the impact of operational losses was materialized into market value 
loss immediately (Cummins, Lewis and Wei (2006) found a great significance on -5/+5 
trading days’ event window) so this was the first choice to report results. After a second 
trial of regression models with one-year lagged values, operational risk results did not 
vary, neither under stable nor adverse economic scenarios; thus, results for lagged-model 
are not reported. 
Concerning the CET1 first regression model, Table 11 shows in this case the opposite 
selection of fixed-random effects model (random effects for the European, Northern and 
Western-Central countries; fixed effects for the Southern countries). Results show that 
most of our previous statements are held as well in this second check of the regression 
model. For instance, and referring to the variable of interest, operational risk is found to 
be still insignificant for the European Union as a whole and the regions analyzed except 
from the Western-Central group of countries.  
Consequently, it is possible to say that, even though alternative models present much 
lower predictive explanatory power (only in the case of Southern countries was found a 
higher explanatory power than its respective fixed effect), results are almost repeated: 
mainly solvency ratio is again a very significant value; liquidity in two of the regions 
(while coefficients change signs); other variables can even become significant in some of 
the regions. Facts such as the operational risk significance or the solvency and liquidity 
ratios support the theories and the answer to the original research question. On the 
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contrary, the selection of these models has been proved to be non-optimal, leading to 
results like the change of signs in the case of Western-Central liquidity.  
The selection, then, between fixed and random effects’ models is efficient, meanwhile 
having close or similar results from the use of one model to another means that the 
difference between both was very narrow. It can be observed, as the Table 7 shows, that 
individual variables can be significant to be proven in a random effect model or vice 
versa, and then the difference between coefficients from one model to another becomes 
much lower. Despite this tight difference, the value to consider is the one applied by the 
Hausman Test, which gives the overall model selection.  
Next, regression model for the stress tests is compared following the same procedure as 
the CET1 regression did. Now the alternative model for both period 2013-16 and 2015-
18 is the random effects model, given that we found high significance (p-value lower than 
0.05) in the Hausman Test. This time, the results are shown in columns a) and b) for the 
2013-16 and 2015-18 period, respectively. According to results, the significance 
completely changes from one model to another: now for the operational risk, the first 
period shows a 2.8% significance when under fixed effects did not; same case is applied 
for the net income variable in period 15-18. Its positive relationship would imply that a 
lower net income would impact negatively the final capital adequacy ratio during that 
period; on the contrary, risks variables have opposite direction than performance variables 
do: higher operational risk, which is meant to be losses, would be explaining lower capital 
adequacy ratio, but it is the opposite way according to this model, as the coefficient sign 
is positive. This now seems to go in a different direction to what it is supposed. 
[Table 12 here] 
A different outcome is obtained from the other two types of risk included in the stress 
tests: with respect to the credit and market risk, coefficient signs are negative, hence 
inversely impacting the capital adequacy ratio under adverse economic scenarios. In the 
case of the market risk, it is also shown to be significant; this implies that the market 
risk’s increase under financial distress would impact negatively the capital adequacy ratio 
of the European union banks (ranging from 5 to 10% change). This conclusion seems to 
be worth as it is observed, in table 13 for individual variables in Hausman Tests, that the 
market risk variable is meant to be assessed in both subperiods under a random effects 
model. This may have a consistent conclusion (in spite of the fact that adjusted R-squared 
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for both subperiods are extremely lower than the ones predicted under fixed effects) that 
is in line with previous findings such as Allen and Saunders (2004) where they stated that, 
instead of operational risk, other significant risks as credit or market risk could be are 
indeed cyclical, that is, related to systemic failures in the economy.  
[Table 13 here] 
As a consequence of this last argument in the stress tests’ robustness check, the inclusion 
of a leverage variable was thought to be convenient, thus, to provide more alternative 
models to the preliminary one. The leverage ratio used is the Basel III leverage ratio 
published in the 2015-18 stress-tests: given the data constraint, it is only analyzed in the 
case of the second subperiod as EBA stress tests did not provide data for more variables 
in preceding tests. Moreover, the leverage ratio is interesting to be included as, in the first 
regression model, was proved to be significant and explaining capital adequacy behavior 
(in that case “Solvency” variable or the ability of banks to repay their long-term 
liabilities). Previous tables 12 and 13 add a third column named c) to show results both 
for the regression analysis results and Hausman tests in the case of Leverage adjusted 
model.  
Regarding the Hausman Test choice between fixed or random effects, the p-value 
obtained is equal to 0, then null hypothesis is accepted, and fixed effects should be applied 
for this model. More specifically, in the case of this adjusted model, all variables are 
properly assessed using the fixed effect models (even market and credit risk have lower 
than 5 and 10% level significance, respectively). In addition to this, this adjusted model 
has a much higher explanatory power with respect to the previous ones, of 96%, which 
implies that results for this one are meant to be conclusive.  
Moving to the regression analysis, now high significance is found in the included variable, 
Leverage, confirming the findings of the first regression model under “stable” economic 
conditions: with a very big coefficient term (178% change), leverage is meant to be 
driving the capital adequacy ratio, as the positive sign represents. Leverage in the 
European Union becomes a very important financial instrument for macroeconomic 
policies and, relating to banks, a preferred tool if the purpose is to improve their capital 
adequacy; opposite conclusion can also be derived as a lower leverage ratio will incur in 
a worse capital adequacy. In spite of the fact that this variable, towards systemic risk, 
cannot be compared to liquidity as it was in the first regression model, it is presumed that 
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the behavior is potentially the same given the explanatory power of the model – 
consequently, banks are found to be more leveraged if capital adequacy ratio was higher 
and vice versa - .  
A second variable is also significant, the credit risk: opposite to the other two types of 
risk, credit risk is impacting the capital adequacy under financial distress by 1.3% per unit 
change (at a 6.2% significance level). Again, risks other than operational risk are more 
important and explanatory for the bank’s capital adequacy requirements, following 
findings from previous authors and this paper itself, within a model with higher 
explanatory power.  
Once the alternative models have been evaluated, multicollinearity checks are provided 
to reinforce the validity of the chosen models. Collinearity is the problem that arises from 
the possible linear relationship existing between two or more variables within a regression 
model, which has been broadly solved with the implementation of Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) (Salmerón Gómez et al., 2016); in this estimation, it is assessed the 
collinearity of variable Xi, i=1, ... , p, with the rest of the independent variables, defined 
by the following :  
(4) VIF(i) = 1 / (1 – R2 i), i = 1, ... , p, 
where R2i is the coefficient of determination of Xi on the rest of independent variables.  
The value obtained from the computation of VIFs is then compared to general rule of 
thumbs, set by the maximum inflated coefficient a variable can reach. As discussed by 
O’Brien (2007), despite improvements that are still needed to be done, the general rule 
has been set to a maximum coefficient of 10. Hence, this is the value that is being 
considered in this paper for the multicollinearity check of the regression models. 
Following tables 14 and 15 show the centered VIFs of the variables present in each of the 
regression models; firstly table 14 presents VIFs for the CET1 regression under proper 
Hausman Test model selection ; table 15 those belonging to Stress tests regression, both 
under proper and alternative Hausman Test models.  
[Table 14 here] 
[Table 15 here] 
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As it is observed, both for the first and second regression models, in all the possible fixed 
and random effects regression models, VIFs are proved to be under the threshold of 10 
previously indicated. Table 14 divides VIFs into regions and European Union, where all 
of them showed a very low coefficient (only two of them exceeded the coefficient of 2). 
It means that the first section of this thesis accomplishes the multicollinearity checks and 
requirements from this VIFs. Similarly, the Stress Tests meet the threshold of 10 in all of 
its forms, but significant changes are appreciated when random effects were introduced; 
from fixed effects around 1.5 on average, operational risk or credit risk reached the 8 and 
7 coefficients under random effects, close to the maximum requirement and, then being 
potentially multicollinear with respect to capital adequacy. These coefficients again are 
reduced to lower levels when Leverage is adjusted to the model.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis studies the effect that operational risk has on the capital adequacy of European 
Union banks and the implication of operational risk in the systemic risk of European 
banks by examining 21 countries and 119 banks from 2013 to 2018. The research is 
conducted by assessing annual ratios and amounts for banks or regions with a panel of 
controlling variables under fixed or random effect estimation models. The main results 
are analyzed considering robustness checks ranging from econometric techniques and 
alternative variables and models.  
According to previous empirical evidence, the role of operational risk in the banking 
industry had diverse interpretations and effects. Many different approaches about the 
measure and model adopted to explain the relationship between operational risk and 
bank’s performance have been adopted, thus without having a consensus and 
homogeneity on the procedures. An example of this limitation is discussed by 
Abdymomunov and Ergen (2017) where tail loss reporting weakens the measurement of 
aggregated operational risk, which is translated into inaccurate risk modelling.  Similarly, 
it has not been broadly proved that operational risk is determinant to the banks’ losses, 
either under systemic risk; meanwhile other variables have shown higher level of 
significance, that is, explaining in a more accurate way patterns within the banking 
system.  
Based on results of this thesis, supported by previous literature within banking industry 
in different geographic groups, it is possible to conclude that the operational risk does not 
have an impact on the capital adequacy of European banks under stable and adverse 
economic conditions. This type of risk is not driving the overall ability of European banks 
to accomplish minimum regulatory requirements, which determine their financial 
strength. This finding supports the conclusion of Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton (2006), 
that can also be extensive to other literature in a regulatory field. Nevertheless, the case 
of Western-Central banks in Europe shows little significance which can be explored and, 
then, argued for future research. The fact that banking industry is idiosyncratic as Cerasi, 
Chizzolini and Ivaldi (2002) discussed, provides the possibility to further investigate 
uniform patterns among banking sectors with different typology and commercial 
strategies. 
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Further insights are obtained from regression models. Both Long-term and Short-term 
ability to repay debt are the real drivers of the capital adequacy of European banks, with 
much more preference for long-term debt. Long-run indebtedness is a common financial 
instrument for European banks which results in better performance and ability to meet 
regulatory requirements. Once said this, this thesis does not investigate the level of debt 
that is potentially beneficial or harmful for the economy, which has been a point of debate 
through financial literature. Robustness checks also give similar results to original 
regression model, indicating that the financial strength is still measured by the long and 
short run liability repayment instead of external risks to the banking business processes. 
This leads to the conclusion that the banking sector is dependent on their internal financial 
instruments and commercial strategies to improve or to meet regulatory requirements 
imposed by central banks.  
Additionally, systemic risk in the form of worse-case economic conditions are not found 
to be influenced by the rise of operational losses. Regression model for the stress tests of 
the European Banking Authority are not demonstrating relationship between operational 
risk and the capital adequacy observed in the event of financial distress. This first model 
is tested, in the Robustness check section, under alternative random effects where market 
risk shows impact for the periods analyzed in this thesis. Likewise, the preliminary model 
is improved by the inclusion of the Leverage ratio also published by the EBA, where this 
indicator together with credit risk are proved to be impacting the capital adequacy ratio. 
Therefore, results support previous findings from Allen and Saunders (2004) stating that 
other types of risk rather than operational risk have a procyclical pattern with adverse 
economic conditions.  
Findings of this study reflect the absence of homogeneous practices within European 
banks from different regions. This heterogeneity is also motivated by the availability of 
data from a very recent period, since 2013, given the fact that regulatory reporting and 
stress tests publication have started at that time, motivated by Basel III new regulations 
imposed to banks. Further and accurate research can be driven with the aim of gathering 
larger time-series data, eliminating biases within short time frames. Operational risk 
disclosure, already indicated by Bischoff (2009) can lead to the reinforcement in the 
operational regulatory practices for central public banks, which in turn will lead 
individual banks to report accurately and timely the set of other risks incurred.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Total Number of Supervised Financial Institutions by EBA 
YEAR  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
NºCOUNTRIES  21 24 24 24 25 25 
NºBANKS  105 131 131 131 132 130 
 
Table 2. Number of Supervised Financial Institutions by EBA per country and year 
 
*data as of 30th June 
AUSTRIA 2 5 8 8 6 6
BELGIUM 1 5 6 6 6 6
BULGARIA - - 1 1 1 1
CYPRUS 1 3 4 4 3 3
DENMARK 4 4 4 4 4 4
ESTONIA - - - 1 1 1
FINLAND 1 1 2 2 2 2
FRANCE 4 10 12 11 11 11
GERMANY 12 20 19 19 20 20
GREECE 4 - 4 4 4 4
HUNGARY 1 1 1 1 1 1
ICELAND - - - - 3 3
IRELAND 3 3 4 5 4 4
ITALY 6 14 15 11 11 11
LATVIA - 1 1 1 - -
LUXEMBOURG 1 2 5 5 5 5
MALTA 1 1 3 3 3 3
NETHERLANDS 4 6 6 6 6 6
NORWAY 1 1 2 3 3 3
POLAND 1 1 1 2 2 2
PORTUGAL 4 3 6 5 5 5
ROMANIA - - 1 1 1 1
SLOVENIA 2 2 2 3 3 3
SPAIN 4 14 14 13 12 12
SWEDEN 4 4 6 7 7 7
UNITED KINGDOM 4 4 4 6 6 6
OTHER BANKS - - - 1 1 1
COUNTRY/YEAR 2013* 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018*
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Table 3. List of banks included in the final sample for CET1 regression model 
REGION COUNTRY BANK 
NORTHERN DENMARK Danske Bank 
  DENMARK Jyske Bank 
  DENMARK Sydbank 
  FINLAND OP-POHJOLA GROUP 
  ICELAND Íslandsbanki hf. 
  ICELAND Landsbankinn 
  IRELAND Allied Irish Banks, Plc 
  IRELAND Bank of Ireland Group plc 
  IRELAND Citibank Holdings Ireland Limited  
  IRELAND DEPFA BANK Plc 
  IRELAND Permanent TSB Group Holdings Plc 
  NORWAY DNB BANK ASA 
  SWEDEN Länsförsäkringar Bank AB - group 
  SWEDEN NORDEA BANK AB (PUBL) 
  SWEDEN SBAB Bank AB - group 
  SWEDEN SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB (PUBL) (SEB) 
  SWEDEN SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN AB (PUBL) 
  SWEDEN SWEDBANK AB (PUBL) 
  UNITED KINGDOM BARCLAYS plc 
  UNITED KINGDOM HSBC HOLDINGS plc 
  UNITED KINGDOM LLOYDS BANKING GROUP plc 
  UNITED KINGDOM Nationwide Building Society 
  UNITED KINGDOM ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP plc 
  UNITED KINGDOM Standard Chartered Plc 
SOUTHERN CYPRUS Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited 
  CYPRUS Co -operative Central Bank Ltd 
  CYPRUS Hellenic Bank Public Company Ltd 
  CYPRUS RCB Bank Ltd 
  GREECE Alpha Bank AE 
  GREECE Eurobank Ergasias SA 
  GREECE National Bank of Greece SA 
  GREECE Piraeus Bank SA 
  ITALY Banca Carige SpA - Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia 
  ITALY Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA 
  ITALY Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna SC 
  ITALY Banca Popolare di Milano Scarl 
  ITALY Banca Popolare di Sondrio 
  ITALY Banca Popolare di Vicenza SCpA 
  ITALY Banco Popolare Società Cooperativa 
  ITALY Credito Emiliano Holding SpA 
  ITALY Credito Valtellinese 
  ITALY ICCREA Holding 
  ITALY Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 
55 
 
  ITALY Mediobanca - Banca di Credito Finanziario SpA 
  ITALY UniCredit SpA 
  ITALY Unione di Banche Italiane SCpA 
  ITALY Veneto Banca SCpA 
  MALTA BANK OF VALLETTA (BOV) 
  MALTA MDB Group Limited 
  PORTUGAL BANCO BPI, SA 
  PORTUGAL Banco Comercial Português SA 
  PORTUGAL Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo, CRL 
  PORTUGAL Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
  PORTUGAL Caixa Geral de Depósitos SA 
  PORTUGAL ESPIRITO SANTO FINANCIAL GROUP, SA (ESFG) 
  PORTUGAL Novo Banco 
  SLOVENIA Abanka d.d. 
  SLOVENIA NOVA KREDITNA BANKA MARIBOR D.D. 
  SLOVENIA NOVA LJUBLJANSKA BANKA D.D. (NLB d.d.) 
  SPAIN Abanca Holding Hispania 
  SPAIN Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. 
  SPAIN Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo SA 
  SPAIN Banco de Sabadell, S.A. 
  SPAIN Banco Mare Nostrum 
  SPAIN Bankinter SA 
  SPAIN BFA Tenedora de Acciones 
  SPAIN CaixaBank, S.A 
  SPAIN Ibercaja Banco, S.A. 
  SPAIN Kutxabank, S.A. 
  SPAIN Liberbank, S.A. 
  SPAIN Unicaja Banco S.A. 
WEST-CENTRAL AUSTRIA Aareal Bank AG 
  AUSTRIA BAWAG Group AG 
  AUSTRIA Erste Group Bank AG 
  AUSTRIA Raiffeisen Bank International AG 
  AUSTRIA Raiffeisen-Holding Niederösterreich-Wien Registrierte 
  AUSTRIA Raiffeisen-Landesbanken-Holding GmbH 
  AUSTRIA Volksbanken Verbund 
  AUSTRIA VTB Bank (Austria) AG 
  BELGIUM AXA Bank Belgium SA 
  BELGIUM Belfius Banque SA 
  BELGIUM DEXIA SA 
  BELGIUM Investar 
  BELGIUM KBC Group NV 
  FRANCE BNP Paribas SA 
  FRANCE Crédit Agricole Group 
  FRANCE Crédit Mutuel Group 
  FRANCE CRH (Caisse de Refinancement de l'Habitat) 
  FRANCE Groupe BPCE 
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  FRANCE La Banque Postale 
  FRANCE RCI banque (Renault Crédit International Banque) 
  FRANCE Société Générale SA 
  GERMANY Bayerische Landesbank 
  GERMANY Commerzbank AG 
  GERMANY DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale 
  GERMANY Deutsche Apotheker- und Ärztebank eG 
  GERMANY Deutsche Bank AG 
  GERMANY Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG 
  GERMANY Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank AG 
  GERMANY Erwerbsgesellschaft der S-Finanzgruppe mbH & Co. KG 
  GERMANY HASPA Finanzholding 
  GERMANY HSH Nordbank AG 
  GERMANY Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 
  GERMANY Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale 
  GERMANY Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg–Förderbank 
  GERMANY Münchener Hypothekenbank eG 
  GERMANY NORD/LB Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
  GERMANY SPAREBANK 1 SMN 
  GERMANY SR-bank   
  GERMANY VW Financial Services AG 
  LUXEMBOURG Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat, Luxembourg 
  LUXEMBOURG Precision Capital S.A. 
  NETHERLANDS ABN AMRO BANK NV 
  NETHERLANDS Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A. 
  NETHERLANDS ING Groep N.V. 
  NETHERLANDS N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten 
  NETHERLANDS SNS BANK NV 
  POLAND Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności Bank Polski SA 
  POLAND Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA 
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Table 4. List of banks included in the final sample for stress-test regression model 
BANK COUNTRY 
ERSTE GROUP BANK AG AUSTRIA 
RAIFFEISEN ZENTRALBANK OSTERREICH AG AUSTRIA 
KBC BANK BELGIUM 
BANK OF CYPRUS PUBLIC CO LTD CYPRUS 
DANSKE BANK DENMARK 
JYSKE BANK DENMARK 
NYKREDIT DENMARK 
OP-POHJOLA GROUP FINLAND 
BNP PARIBAS FRANCE 
BPCE FRANCE 
CREDIT AGRICOLE FRANCE 
SOCIETE GENERALE FRANCE 
Crédit Mutuel Group FRANCE 
La Banque Postale FRANCE 
BAYERISCHE LANDESBANK GERMANY 
COMMERZBANK AG GERMANY 
DEKABANK DEUTSCHE GIROZENTRALE, FRANKFURT GERMANY 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG GERMANY 
DZ BANK AG DT. ZENTRAL-GENOSSENSCHAFTSBANK GERMANY 
HSH NORDBANK AG, HAMBURG GERMANY 
LANDESBANK BADEN-WURTTEMBERG GERMANY 
LANDESBANK HESSEN-THURINGEN GZ, FRANKFURT GERMANY 
NORDDEUTSCHE LANDESBANK -GZ- GERMANY 
VW Financial Services AG GERMANY 
ALPHA BANK GREECE 
EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS S.A. GREECE 
NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE GREECE 
PIRAEUS BANK GROUP GREECE 
ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC IRELAND 
BANK OF IRELAND IRELAND 
PERMANENT TSB IRELAND 
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA S.p.A ITALY 
INTESA SANPAOLO S.p.A ITALY 
UNICREDIT S.p.A ITALY 
UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE SCPA (UBI BANCA) ITALY 
BANQUE ET CAISSE D'EPARGNE DE L'ETAT LUXEMBOURG 
BANK OF VALLETTA (BOV) MALTA 
ABN AMRO BANK NV NETHERLANDS 
ING BANK NV NETHERLANDS 
RABOBANK NEDERLAND NETHERLANDS 
N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten NETHERLANDS 
DNB BANK ASA NORWAY 
POWSZECHNA KASA OSZCZEDNOSCI BANK POLSKI S.A.  POLAND 
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BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES, SA  PORTUGAL 
CAIXA GERAL DE DEPOSITOS, SA PORTUGAL 
NOVA LJUBLJANSKA BANKA D.D. (NLB d.d.) SLOVENIA 
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA S.A. (BBVA) SPAIN 
BANCO SANTANDER S.A. SPAIN 
CAIXABANK SPAIN 
BFA Tenedora de Acciones SPAIN 
NORDEA BANK AB (PUBL) SWEDEN 
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB (PUBL) (SEB) SWEDEN 
BARCLAYS plc UNITED KINGDOM 
HSBC HOLDINGS plc UNITED KINGDOM 
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP plc UNITED KINGDOM 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP plc UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for CET1 regression model 
EU Mean St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
CET_1 14.17 2.90 24.60 8.15 259 
OP.RISK* 18.59 24.17 105.96 0.38 259 
SIZE* 488.03 619.16 2671.32 6.85 259 
NORTHERN Mean St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
CET_1 16.05 3.30 24.60 9.10 69 
OP.RISK* 22.15 27.82 105.96 0.39 69 
SIZE* 621.21 713.49 2671.32 8.75 69 
WEST-CENTRAL Mean St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
CET_1 14.22 2.42 20.50 9.70 77 
OP.RISK* 26.95 26.77 93.49 0.48 77 
SIZE* 725.78 710.25 2077.76 15.20 77 
SOUTHERN Mean St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
CET_1 12.76 1.93 17.40 8.15 111 
OP.RISK* 11.22 16.74 72.76 0.38 111 
SIZE* 256.00 360.11 1459.27 6.85 111 
*Data in million euros  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for stress’ tests regression model 
13-16 Mean St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
CET_1 9.82 2.31 15.34 4.12 189 
OP.RISK* 18.75 21.10 86.44 0.38 189 
Net Income* -3.68 45.27 12.54 -622.00 189 
15-18 Mean St.Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
CET_1 11.57 3.13 20.01 3.40 177 
OP.RISK* 21.84 25.34 105.96 0.76 177 
Net Income* -0.03 2.35 12.80 -16.67 177 
*Data in million euros 
 
Table 7. Hausman test for CET1 regression model 
Hausman Test - Cross Section Random  
    
  EU Northern 
West-
Central Southern 
P-value  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.44 
Hausman Test - Cross Section Random      
P-value  EU Northern 
West-
Central Southern 
Op.Risk 0.88 0.90 0.10 0.74 
Size 0.03 0.78 0.09 0.39 
Market-to-Book ratio 0.95 0.03 0.00 0.33 
RoA 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.52 
Liquidity  0.58 0.31 0.00 0.29 
Solvency  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.29 
Credit Risk 0.00 0.51 0.95 0.26 
Sovereign Risk 0.86 0.03 0.00 0.57 
 
Table 8. Hausman test for Stress test regression model 
Hausman Test - Fixed/Random Effect Criteria   
  (1) (2) 
P-value  0.022 0.000 
(1) 2013-2016 stress test – model 
(2) 2015-2018 stress test – model 
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Table 9. OLS regression for Operational Risk Exposure on CET 1. Columns from 1 to 5 
show results of the regression model according to European Union banks, Northern, 
West-Central and Southern countries, using bank fixed/random effects. First figures 
represent coefficient terms, p-values are shown in parenthesis. Statistical significance of 
the explanatory variable indicated with an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% level of 
confidence. Sample data range from year 2013 to 2018. 
  EU Northern 
West-
Central Southern Southern 
Constant  15.6630 14.4154 7.3597 17.0495 13.0483 
 (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.098)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Operational Risk 0.0047 -0.0488 0.0450 -0.0272 -0.0495 
 (0.806) (0.340) (0.087)* (0.657) (0.164) 
Size -0.0033 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0095 0.0024 
 (0.015**) (0.923) (0.893) (0.118) (0.367) 
Market-to-Book ratio 0.1666 -0.2550 -0.4148 0.0796 0.2027 
 (0.216) (0.785) (0.716) (0.587) (0.137) 
RoA 0.0128 0.7857 2.6113 0.0026 0.0025 
 (0.459) (0.584) (0.071)* (0.888) (0.886) 
Liquidity  -0.0478 -0.0617 -0.0879 -0.0750 -0.0668 
 (0.045)** (0.233) (0.055)* (0.063)* (0.001)*** 
Solvency  0.3974 1.0486 1.5153 0.3184 0.4638 
 (0.001)*** (0.013)** (0.000)*** (0.034)** (0.000)*** 
Credit Risk 0.0001 -0.3610 0.0000 -0.0090 0.0137 
 (0.809) (0.066)* (0.789) (0.793) (0.339) 
Sovereign Risk -0.0045 -0.0063 -0.0059 0.0167 -0.0080 
  (0.318) (0.371) (0.454) (0.450) (0.528) 
      
Bank fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Bank Random effect No No No No Yes 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 525 107 214 191 191 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.83 0.84 0.90 0.63 0.36 
S.E. of regression 1.18 1.33 0.76 1.20 1.26 
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Table 10. OLS regression for Operational Risk Exposure on adverse scenario CET 1. 
Columns from 1 to 2 show results of the regression model according to 2013-2016 and 
2015-2018 periods, respectively. First figures represent coefficient terms, p-values are 
shown in parenthesis. Statistical significance of the explanatory variable indicated with 
an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% level of confidence. 
  (1) (2) 
Constant  8.688 13.868 
 (0.016)** (0.000)*** 
Operational Risk 0.029 -0.038 
 (0.885) (0.523) 
Net Income -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.853) (0.777) 
Market Risk 0.016 -0.006 
 (0.587) (0.921) 
Credit Risk 0.002 -0.008 
 (0.813) (0.445) 
   
      
Bank fixed effect Yes Yes 
Bank Random effect No No 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes 
Observations 189 177 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.828 0.914 
S.E. of regression 0.96 0.92 
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Table 11. OLS regression for Operational Risk Exposure on CET 1: alternative models. 
Columns from 1 to 5 show results of the regression model according to European Union 
banks, Northern, West-Central and Southern countries, using bank fixed/random effects. 
First figures represent coefficient terms, p-values are shown in parenthesis. Statistical 
significance of the explanatory variable indicated with an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and 
***1% level of confidence. Sample data range from year 2013 to 2018. 
  EU Northern 
West-
Central Southern Southern 
Constant  11.7966 11.5863 9.4281 13.0483 17.0495 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Operational Risk -0.0010 -0.0446 0.0454 -0.0495 -0.0272 
 (0.956) (0.273) (0.013)** (0.164) (0.657) 
Size -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0025 0.0024 -0.0095 
 (0.139) (0.587) (0.027)** (0.367) (0.118) 
Market-to-Book ratio 0.2158 -1.1602 -1.1158 0.2027 0.0796 
 (0.131) (0.144) (0.247) (0.137) (0.587) 
RoA 0.0032 2.5250 0.5011 0.0025 0.0026 
 (0.868) (0.009)*** (0.607) (0.886) (0.888) 
Liquidity  -0.0157 0.0087 0.0686 -0.0668 -0.0750 
 (0.429) (0.790) (0.026)** (0.001)*** (0.063)* 
Solvency  0.5124 0.7141 0.2459 0.4638 0.3184 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.178) (0.000)*** (0.034)** 
Credit Risk -0.0001 -0.3665 0.0000 0.0137 -0.0090 
 (0.775) (0.000)*** (0.877) (0.339) (0.793) 
Sovereign Risk 0.0028 -0.0003 0.0096 -0.0080 0.0167 
  (0.538) (0.956) (0.137) (0.528) (0.450) 
      
Bank fixed effect No No No No Yes 
Bank Random effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Time fixed effect No No No No Yes 
Observations 525 107 214 191 191 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.14 0.44 0.19 0.36 0.63 
S.E. of regression 1.43 1.45 1.14 1.26 1.20 
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Table 12. OLS regression for Operational Risk Exposure on CET 1 under stress tests: 
alternative models. Columns from a) to c) show results of the regression model according 
to random effects in period 13-16, random effects in period 15-18 and fixed effects with 
leverage included in period 15-18. First figures represent coefficient terms, p-values are 
shown in parenthesis. Statistical significance of the explanatory variable indicated with 
an asterix: * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% level of confidence.  
  ( a ) ( b ) ( c ) 
Constant  10.213 12.582 6.303 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Operational Risk 0.079 0.047 -0.051 
 (0.028)** (0.235) (0.179) 
Net Income 0.005 0.226 -0.038 
 (0.209) (0.000)*** (0.169) 
Market Risk -0.055 -0.103 0.019 
 (0.007)*** (0.021)** (0.614) 
Credit Risk -0.006 -0.005 -0.013 
 (0.142) (0.171) (0.062)* 
Basel III Leverage   1.718 
      (0.000)*** 
Bank fixed effect No No Yes 
Bank Random effect Yes Yes No 
Time fixed effect No No Yes 
Observations 189 177 177 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.058 0.149 0.965 
S.E. of regression 1.604 1.78 0.6 
 
 
 
Table 13. Hausman test for Stress test regression model: alternative models 
Hausman Test - 
Fixed/Random Effect 
Criteria    
      ( c ) 
P-value      0.000 
Hausman Test - Cross section Random Effect   
  ( a ) ( b ) ( c ) 
Op.Risk 0.729 0.002 0.000 
Net Income 0.568 0.000 0.000 
Market Risk 0.183 0.778 0.037 
Credit Risk 0.522 0.010 0.070 
Basel III Leverage     0.000 
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Table 14. Multicollinearity Test: VIFs for CET1 regression model 
Variance Inflation Factor - Centered      
  EU Northern 
West-
Central Southern 
Op.Risk 1.07 1.52 1.61 1.16 
Size 1.08 1.33 1.92 2.53 
Market-to-Book ratio 1.12 1.24 1.85 1.13 
RoA 1.13 1.57 1.83 1.14 
Liquidity  1.03 1.15 1.06 1.09 
Solvency  1.08 1.19 1.48 1.30 
Credit Risk 1.05 1.29 1.50 1.16 
Sovereign Risk 1.07 1.24 1.64 2.46 
 
 
 
Table 15. Multicollinearity Test: VIFs for Stress Tests regression models 
Variance Inflation Factor - Centered        
  (1) (2) ( a ) ( b ) ( c ) 
Op.Risk 1.123 1.235 8.358 8.929 4.721 
Net Income 1.219 1.098 1.006 1.105 1.203 
Market Risk 1.788 2.275 3.636 5.202 3.393 
Credit Risk 2.193 2.062 7.758 4.247 3.478 
Basel III Leverage         1.155 
1) Fixed effects 13-16 
2) Fixed effects 15-18 
a) random effects 13-16 
b) random effects 15-18 
c) fixed effects 15-18: leverage adjusted 
 
